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a b s t r a c t
Since sending explicit messages can be costly, people often utilize ‘‘what is not said,’’ i.e., informative
silence, to economize communication. This paper studies the efficient communication rule, which is
fully informative while minimizing the use of explicit messages, in cooperative environments. It is
shown that when the notion of context is defined as the finest mutually self-evident event that contains
the current state, the efficient use of informative silence exhibits the defining property of indexicals
in natural languages. While the efficient use of silence could be complex, it is also found that the
efficient use of silence can be as ‘‘simple’’ as the use of indexicals in natural languages if and only if
the information structure satisfies some centrality and dominance properties.
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Uttering and writing words might not be as laborious as piling
up bricks, yet they still consume time and cognitive energy. Con-
sequently, people often utilize ‘‘informative silence’’ to economize
communication. For example, suppose that a manager wants a
worker to perform his routine task. Unless the worker is new
to the office, the manager usually does not need to provide any
explicit instruction to make the worker perform the routine; a
competent worker would interpret the fact that the manager did
not give any explicit instruction as the implicit instruction to
perform his routine. This type of informative silence can be found
in almost every practical communication; in fact, if we need to be
explicit about every single detail as silence conveys no informa-
tion, our verbal messages would sound like commands to a robot,
and our written messages would look like a computer program.
Understanding tacit communication in cooperative environments
is important for economics since many economic activities rely on
cooperative communication that utilizes implicit messages.
If people can communicate with silence so appropriately and
broadly across various environments, the use and interpreta-
tion of informative silence need to follow ‘‘conversational logic’’
shared by a linguistic community, i.e., pragmatics.1 The purpose
of this paper is to investigate such a tacit communication rule
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1 Pragmatics is a branch of linguistics and semiotics that studies the ways in
which context contributes to meaning.
based on the approach that is familiar to economic theory; the
tacit communication rule is analyzed as the efficient communi-
cation rule designed by a fictitious linguistic engineer. This paper
shows that the way silence conveys information in the efficient
rule is analogous to indexicals in natural languages. The find-
ing provides novel insights into how economic agents combine
explicit and implicit messages in cooperative communication.
The current paper considers the following simple communi-
cation problem to analyze tacit communication in a cooperative
environment. There are two agents, a speaker and a listener.
There is a finite set of states, and each agent is endowed with
a partitional information function where each cell in the speaker
(listener)’s partition is interpreted as the speaker (listener)’s ‘‘sit-
uation’’ at the state. A communication rule is then defined as
the sender’s messaging rule that specifies whether to send an
explicit message, which is costly, or remain silent, which is cost-
less, at each state. The premise of this paper is that the tacit
communication rule, i.e., the pragmatics of informative silence,
is determined by a fictitious linguistic engineer who designs the
efficient communication rule in the cooperative environment. The
current paper then studies the efficient communication rule that
fully conveys the speaker’s private information while minimizing
the use of explicit messages.
Due to the nature of silence, an agent cannot use informa-
tive silence to indicate two different situations that cannot be
distinguished from the perspective of the listener. Thus, when
the speaker uses informative silence in one situation, it could
restrict the feasibility of informative silence in other situations.
Since the set of indistinguishable situations for the listener can
be interwoven, solving the trade-off can be complex. Moreover,
because of the combinatorial nature of the problem, a small
change in the prior probability could dramatically change the
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.06.002
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efficient use of silence. Consequently, there is no simple regularity
in the efficient use of informative silence in general.
The key to understanding the efficient use of silence is the
concept of indexicality. In semiotics and philosophy of language,
indexicals are signs or words whose reference is systematically
determined by a context. For instance, the indexical ‘‘I’’ itself does
not refer to any particular person by itself, but it refers to Mike
in the context where Mike utters the word ‘‘I’’. That is, the word
‘‘I’’ operates as a function that specifies the content of ‘‘I’’ once
the input variable ‘‘utterer’’ is given by a context. Similarly, the
indexical ‘‘now’’ itself does not refer to a particular time by itself,
but the content is determined once a context provides the time of
utterance. In other words, an indexical indicates an object with-
out using the name by utilizing contextual information, which
is public by nature. For example, the indexical ‘‘now’’ exploits
the fact that the date of the utterance is common knowledge
between agents, whereas the indexical ‘‘I’’ utilizes the fact that
the speaker of ‘‘I’’ is common knowledge between agents. In
the current paper, since the subject of communication is the
speaker’s situation, a context is defined as the finest mutually
self-evident event that contains the current state. Then, it is
shown that informative silence in efficient communication rules
also has an indexical property; silence itself does not refer to
any particular situation by itself, but the content of silence is
determined once a context is given. More specifically, given a
context, call a situation or a union of situations of the speaker as
an implicitly expressible event if there exists a fully informative
rule that uses silence for the event. Then, informative silence
in any efficient communication rule systematically refers to the
most likely implicitly expressible event given the current context.
It is also found that the common knowledge property in the
definition of context is essential for the indexicality of informative
silence; that is, if the notion of context is defined in a way that
lacks common knowledge property, the efficient use of silence
could fail to have indexical property.
While the indexical property can help us to find the efficient
use of silence to some degree, it does not always tell us the
exact use immediately. This is because informative silence could
refer to a set of situations rather than a specific situation given
a context, and finding out the union of situations that is most
likely given a context requires combinatorial optimization. The
computationally demanding nature is contrary to indexicals in
natural languages, which directly refers to an entity rather than
a non-trivial combination of entities in a context. This paper
then characterizes the information structure in which informa-
tive silence in efficient communication rules directly refers to a
specific situation rather than some combination of situations as
indexicals in natural languages do. To characterize the informa-
tion structure, a notion of centrality in the information structure
is introduced. Intuitively, the speaker’s situation is central in a
context if her situation is relevant to every possible situation of
the listener in the current context.2 Another important property
is local dominance, which is a strong version of the notion of
‘‘most common situation’’. It is shown that informative silence in
the efficient rule directly refers to a specific situation as indexicals
in natural languages do if and only if the specific situation is
central and locally dominant in the current context. This result
has an intriguing implication on the amount of reasoning that the
use of indexicals in natural languages demands; the condition of
centrality suggests that when the speaker’s informative silence
is as direct as indexicals in natural languages, the derivation does
not require the consideration of the listener’s situation that is not
directly relevant to the speaker’s current situation.
2 The centrality in this paper is not a metaphor; when the (interactive)
information structure is represented by a graph, the central situation has the
highest centrality in the graph induced by a context.
Directly referring to a specific situation still does not make
informative silence as user-friendly as indexicals in natural lan-
guages; checking local dominance could require tedious numeri-
cal evaluations, whereas indexicals in natural languages always
refer to an object intuitively given the spatial, temporal, and
personal relations given by context without using any cardinal
information. Thus, this paper also provides the information struc-
ture in which agents can find the efficient use of silence only
from ordinal information. More specifically, I provide a condition
that guarantees the local dominance condition when agents only
know the probability ranking over events.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After the liter-
ature review, Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, the
efficient communication rule is analyzed, and the indexical struc-
ture of informative silence is identified. Section 4 characterizes
information structures in which the efficient use of silence works
as intuitively as indexicals in natural languages do. Section 5
provides some discussions followed by concluding remarks in
Section 6.
Related literature. The current paper contributes to the lit-
erature on ‘‘economics and language’’, which considers natural
languages as a fundamental institution for economic activities
and explains the properties of natural languages based on the
method that is familiar to economics. The approach of the cur-
rent paper is in line with Rubinstein (1996, 2000), which derive
some properties of natural languages as if they are optimally
designed by a fictitious linguistic engineer.3 In his seminal pa-
per, Rubinstein (1996) demonstrates that some binary relations
in natural languages can be obtained from indication-friendliness,
informativeness, and describability.4 In the current paper, on the
other hand, a concept in pragmatics is obtained from the per-
spective of efficiency; informative silence has indexicality when
a communication rule is designed to be efficient.
While pragmatics traditionally focuses on communication in
cooperative environments, the economics literature that utilizes
some concepts in pragmatics has mostly focused on strategic en-
vironments, e.g., Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2006), and Suzuki
(2017).5 The current paper studies pragmatics in the context of
cooperative communication by following the basic tenet of some
major theories in pragmatics: people can communicate beyond
what is explicitly stated since they share some tacit principles
to infer the meaning of an implicit expression beyond what is
explicitly stated.6 Since those theories are not based on formal
models, it is not easy to evaluate to what extent the current paper
shares their principles. However, the current paper is at least in
line with their idea that the economy of communication plays an
important role in tacit communication.7
The current paper is also related to the literature on ‘‘com-
munication in teams’’. When communication is costly, commu-
nication becomes a non-trivial economic problem even under
3 Another approach is based on evolutionary game theory. This approach
investigates the evolutionary stability of a pre-play communication strategy in
a coordination game; for example, Demichelis and Weibull (2008) and Heller
(2014) show that if lying is psychologically costly, the equilibrium in which a
message has a literal meaning is evolutionary stable.
4 In a similar spirit, Blume (2004) shows that a grammatical structure of
natural languages, i.e., modularity, can be derived from learnability.
5 There is also the pragmatics literature that is based on game theory. For
example, Benz et al. (2005) offer some game-theoretical formulations of existing
concepts in pragmatics.
6 For example, Grice (1975), Horn (1984), and Sperber and Wilson (1986).
7 Grice’s quantity maxim requires communication to be efficient: ‘‘Do not
make your contribution more informative than is required’’. Horn’s R Principle
demands ‘‘Say no more than you must’’. Sperber and Wilson (1986) do not
explicitly mention the economy of communication as the main communication
principle. However, their notion of ‘‘optimal relevance’’ essentially takes into
account the economy of communication.
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the common interest setting. Marschak and Radner (1972) ana-
lyze the optimal information protocol in an organization based
on statistical decision theory. Arrow (1974) observes that when
communication is costly, people use ‘‘organizational code’’ to
economize communication. Cremer et al. (2007) formalize the
idea of organizational code and study the nature of the optimal
code under different organizational structures. As in the current
paper, Cremer et al. (2007) derive the organizational code as
an efficient communication system in an environment where
communication is costly. However, the idea of informative si-
lence is qualitatively different from that of organizational code
in Cremer et al. (2007); the premise of their paper is that agents
are boundedly rational and can deal with only a fixed number
of messages. Then, since their code system is coarser than their
state space, the efficient code is essentially an optimal partition of
the state space that balances the trade-off between interpretation
costs and informativeness. On the contrary, in the current paper,
the agent can describe her current situation as her message space
is large enough. However, since sending an explicit message is
costly, the main question is how she can fully convey her private
information while minimizing her use of explicit messages given
an information structure.
The model of this paper is built on the framework of Aumann
(1976). Traditionally, the study of communication in this setting
focuses on the process of two-sided communication that achieves
common knowledge of posterior beliefs, e.g., Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1982) and Parikh et al. (1990). Since the liter-
ature of ‘‘consensus and communication’’ analyzes cooperative
communication, their models do not adopt a game theoretical for-
mulation as in the current paper. However, unlike in the current
paper, they focus on the setting in which agents cannot report
their private information; their main question is whether agents
can reach consensus through communication under a restricted
message space such as posterior beliefs or actions. The question
of the current paper, on the other hand, is entirely different; this
paper is interested in how an agent can efficiently convey her
private information to another agent when she can report her
private information but sending an explicit report is costly. Thus,
unlike in the literature on consensus and communication, the
current paper focuses on one-sided communication even though
the result of the current paper can be extended to two-sided
communication.
Finally, the current paper shows that when indexical silence
works as intuitively as indexicals in natural languages do, the
underlying information structure has to satisfy a centrality con-
dition, which suggests that the derivation of the efficient use of
silence does not require the consideration of the listener’s situa-
tion that is not directly relevant to the speaker’s current situation.
If the property of natural languages reflects the cognitive capacity
of the human mind, the centrality condition can be interpreted
as ‘‘revealed simplicity’’. Thus, the current paper also contributes
to the literature on bounded rationality that formalizes notions
of simplicity and complexity relative to underlying economic
problems. For example, Neyman (1985) and Rubinstein (1986)
utilize finite state automata to define the complexity of strate-
gies in repeated games. Recently, Li (2017) defines simplicity of
dominant strategies, i.e., obviously-dominant strategy, based on
whether the agent can identify dominance without contingent
reasoning, which is similar to the finding of the current paper.
2. Model
There are two agents i = 1, 2. The current paper considers
the partitional information model in Aumann (1976). Let Ω be
a finite set of states, and let π be a prior probability. Nature
draws a state ω ∈ Ω according to a prior π , and an information
function Πi(ω) where Πi : Ω → 2Ω determines agent i’s private
information at ω; that is, agent i at ω knows that the current
state is in Πi(ω) ⊂ Ω . Let Pi be the range of Πi and assume that
Pi is a partition of Ω . In the current paper, it is convenient to
call Pi = Πi(ω) as agent i’s situation at state ω. An information
structure is then defined as (Ω,P, π ) where P = {Pi}i=1,2.
Agent 1 is a speaker, and agent 2 is a listener. The speaker’s set
of messages is M = P1 ∪ {∅} where m = P1 is an explicit report
that refers to the speaker’s situation, whereasm = ∅ signifies ‘‘no
report’’, i.e., silence. Since speaking and writing consume some
time and energy, sending an explicit message is assumed to be
costly.8 Specifically, the cost function of messaging is c(m) where
c : M → [0,∞), and assume that c(∅) = 0 < c(m) = c for all
m ̸= ∅.9
A communication rule is a mapping σ where σ : Ω → M
such that σ (ω) ∈ {Π1(ω),∅} for all ω. That is, a communication
rule specifies whether the speaker remains silent ∅ or report her
situation at the current state Π1(ω).10 A communication rule is
interpreted as pragmatics of ∅, i.e., a tacit communication rule
that governs the use and the meaning of ∅.11
When the speaker sends a message m according to a commu-
nication rule σ , the listener updates her knowledge about the
current situation from P2 based on the message m. Specifically,
let Qσ (m, P2) ⊂ P2 be the listener’s knowledge about the current
situation conditional on P2 and m given a communication rule
σ ; that is, Qσ (m, P2) is the support of the listener’s posterior
belief conditional on P2 and m given σ . It is assumed that the
listener updates her knowledge about the current situation to be
consistent with a communication rule σ . That is,
Qσ (m, P2) = P2 ∩ {ω : σ (ω) = m}.
The current paper considers a communication problem in
which fully informative communication is essential; formally, a
communication rule σ is fully informative if
Qσ (σ (ω),Π2(ω)) = Π1(ω) ∩Π2(ω)
for all ω. Let Σ∗ be the set of fully informative communication
rules.
Since sending an explicit message is costly, the current paper
defines an efficient communication rule as a fully informative
rule that minimizes the expected messaging cost. Formally, a
communication rule σ is efficient if σ solves
min
σ∈Σ∗
∑
ω∈Ω
c(σ (ω))π (ω).
Having equal probabilities of events complicates the exposition
of this paper without adding substance. Hence, throughout this
paper, assume that∑
ω∈X
π (ω) ̸=
∑
ω∈X ′
π (ω)
for any X, X ′ ⊂ Ω such that X ̸= X ′.
There are two comments on the definition of efficient rules.
First, since the current paper is interested in the derivation of
a communication rule in cooperative environments, the designer
8 See Marschak and Radner (1972) and Arrow (1974) for fuller discussions
on communication costs.
9 The result of this paper is preserved even if messaging costs are
heterogeneous across messages as long as the variation is sufficiently small.
10 Note that the current paper considers a communication rule in cooperative
environments. Thus, allowing reports that are coarser than P1 or untruthful does
not add any substance to the paper.
11 One could also interpret a communication rule as an explicit reporting
rule that is designed by an organization. However, the analysis of this paper
is primarily motivated by pragmatics.
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does not need to deal with any incentive issue; the focus of this
paper is on how cooperative communication can be economized
by the use of informative silence. Second, one might consider
that if communication is costly, focusing on fully informative
communication rules is not always natural since the quantity
of communication could be suboptimal. One interpretation of
the current setting is that this paper considers the situation
where the cost of uttering words is not significant enough to
sacrifice informativeness of communication. Another justification
would be that even though the current paper has no explicit
cost–benefit analysis for the optimal quantity of communication,
the current setting is compatible with the consideration of the
optimal quantity. To see this, suppose that we compute the opti-
mal quantity of communication under an ‘‘original’’ information
structure (P0, π ). Then, we can interpret agent 1’s partitions in
the current setting P1 as the coarsening of the original partitions
that reflect the optimal quantity of communication.
The current paper does not adopt the game theoretical for-
mulation even though the most natural purpose of cooperative
communication would be achieving successful coordination. The
rationale of the current approach is that even if communication
is explicitly modeled as a strategy of the speaker in a common in-
terest game, the extra game theoretical structure does not help us
to provide an additional insight into the problem; any fully infor-
mative communication rule can be supported as an equilibrium
communication whereas there is no clear-cut selection criterion
for an equilibrium communication strategy except for ‘‘optimal
equilibrium’’. Then, since the current paper is interested in how
exactly people would use informative silence, it is reasonable to
analyze the efficient communication rule directly as in other pa-
pers that study ‘‘optimal languages’’, e.g., Rubinstein (1996, 2000),
and Cremer et al. (2007). A non-game theoretical treatment of
communication can also be found in the literature on consen-
sus and communication such as Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1982), which also focus on cooperative communication.
3. Efficient communication rule and indexical silence
This section analyzes efficient communication rules. To start
with, I provide the properties of fully informative and admissi-
ble rules. I then show that the efficient use of silence exhibits
indexicality, a special type of context dependence property that
is common in natural languages.
3.1. Preliminary analysis
Whenever the speaker’s message updates the listener’s knowl-
edge about the current state, the speaker’s message refines the
listener’s information partition. A cover of P2, denoted by S, is
a collection of P1 such that (i) P1 ∩ P2 ̸= ∅ for all P1 ∈ S, and
(ii) P2 ⊆ {ω : Π1(ω) ∈ S}.12 In short, the cover of P2 is the set
of all possible situations of the speaker from the perspective of
the listener in the situation P2. Let S(P2) denote the cover of P2.
Clearly, since Pi is a partition of Ω , each P2 has a unique cover.
Example 1. Suppose Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, and P is such that
P1 = {{1, 7}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6}},
P2 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5, 6}, {7}}
Then, the cover of each P2 is S({1, 2}) = {{1, 7}, {2, 3}},
S({3, 4, 5, 6}) = {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6}}, and S({7}) = {1, 7}.
12 In topology, an element of a cover is often restricted to a subset of a covered
set. In the current paper, however, even if P1 ⊋ P2 , P1 is called the cover of P2 .
By using the concept of cover, fully informative communica-
tion rules can be characterized concisely.
Lemma 1. A communication rule is fully informative if and only if
every cover S has at most one P1 ∈ S such that σ (ω) = ∅ for all
ω ∈ P1.
Proof. If part: First, if σ (ω) = Π1(ω), then Qσ (σ (ω),Π2(ω)) =
Π2(ω) ∩ Π1(ω). Second, suppose that, for some P ′2, there exists
only one P ′1 ∈ S(P ′2) such that σ (ω) = ∅ for all ω ∈ P ′1. Then,
Qσ (∅, P ′2) = P ′2 ∩ {ω : σ (ω) = ∅} = P ′2 ∩ P ′1
for all ω ∈ P ′2 ∩ P ′1.
Only if part: Suppose that σ (ω) = ∅ for all ω ∈ P ′1 ∪ P ′′1 where
P ′1, P
′′
1 ∈ S in a fully informative rule. Then, since P ′1, P ′′1 ∈ S, there
exists ω′ ∈ P ′1 such that P ′1 ∩ Π2(ω′) ̸= ∅ and P ′′1 ∩ Π2(ω′) ̸= ∅.
Hence, if the listener receives ∅ at ω′, her updated information
partition is
Qσ (∅,Π2(ω′)) ⊇ Π2(ω′) ∩ (P ′1 ∪ P ′′1 ) ⊋ Π2(ω′) ∩ P ′1
That is, σ is not fully informative, a contradiction. □
The idea of Lemma 1 is straightforward. Note that the listener
cannot distinguish one silence from another silence. Thus, if the
listener cannot distinguish two situations, and the speaker ex-
presses one of them with silence, the speaker never uses silence
to express another situation in any fully informative communica-
tion rule.
Before moving to the analysis of efficient communication
rules, it is useful to study admissible communication rules, which
are reasonable but not necessarily efficient. Formally, given
(Ω,P), a fully informative communication rule σ is admissible
if there is no fully informative rule σ ′ such that∑
ω∈Ω
c(σ ′(ω))π (ω) <
∑
ω∈Ω
c(σ (ω))π (ω).
under any π such that supp(π ) = Ω . In other words, if a
communication rule σ is admissible, there is no other rule σ ′ that
is superior to σ regardless of the prior probability. Clearly, any
efficient rule is admissible.
To provide a property of admissible rules, let S(P1) be the set
of all covers that contain P1.
Proposition 1. If a communication rule σ is admissible, then, given
any P1 ∈ P1, there exists S ∈ S(P1) such that, for some P ′1 ∈ S,
σ (ω) = ∅ for all ω ∈ P ′1.
Proof. See Appendix. □
There are two types of silence in admissible rules. The first
type can be found in the situation where no communication is
required. Suppose that P ′1 is mutually self-evident, i.e., Π2(ω) ⊂
P ′1 for all ω ∈ P ′1. Then, S(P2) = {P ′1} for all P2 ⊂ P ′1, and thus
S = {P ′1} for all S ∈ S(P ′1). Proposition 1 then suggests that
σ (ω) = ∅ for all ω ∈ P ′1. In short, no admissible rule uses an
explicit message when it is common knowledge that the listener
has nothing to learn from the speaker at the current state.
The second type of silence, which is the primary interest of
this paper, is informative silence. Proposition 1 suggests that the
use of informative silence cannot be too conservative in admis-
sible rules; given any situation P1, the speaker uses informative
silence for at least one situation that is ‘‘relevant’’ to P1 from the
perspective of the listener.
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3.2. Efficiency and indexicality
Optimization problems with a real variable can often be pa-
rameterized so that a small change in a parameter-value gener-
ates a small change in the solution. However, such a parametric
regularity is harder to obtain in combinatorial optimization; in
fact, in the efficient communication problem, a very small change
of π can dramatically alter the efficient use of silence. To see this,
consider the following example.
Example 2. Suppose Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and P is such that
P1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}},
P2 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}.
If (π (1), π (2), π (3), π (4), π (5), π (6)) = (0.1, 0.04, 0.25, 0.26,
0.2, 0.15), the efficient communication rule is
σ (ω) =
{
Π1(ω) if ω ∈ {1, 2, 5, 6}
∅ if ω ∈ {3, 4}.
On the other hand, if (π (1), π (2), π (3), π (4), π (5), π (6)) =
(0.1, 0.06, 0.25, 0.24, 0.2, 0.15), then the efficient communica-
tion rule is
σ (ω) =
{
∅ if ω ∈ {1, 2, 5, 6}
Π1(ω) if ω ∈ {3, 4}.
Note that under both cases,∑
ω∈{3,4}
π (ω) >
∑
ω∈{5,6}
π (ω) >
∑
ω∈{1,2}
π (ω).
Thus, even if we restrict our attention to the very simple parti-
tional structure with the certain probability ranking over P1, there
is no simple regularity in the efficient use of silence.
Even if there is no simple regularity in the efficient use of
silence, there can be some general property in the structure of
the efficient rule. The key observation to obtaining a structural
property is the following: if two informative silences, which
are indistinguishable, can refer to two separate situations, the
context of use has to determine the meaning of each silence. In
semiotics and philosophy of language, signs and words whose
references are systematically determined by the context of use
are called indexicals.13 For instance, the word ‘‘I’’ itself does not
refer to any particular person by itself, but it refers to Mike in
the context where Mike utters the word ‘‘I’’. That is, the word ‘‘I’’
operates as a function that specifies the content of ‘‘I’’ once the
input variable ‘‘utterer’’ is given by a context.14 Put differently,
an indexical refers to an object without relying on the name
of the object by exploiting contextual information, which is public
by nature; the indexical ‘‘I’’ exploits the fact the utterer of ‘‘I’’
is common knowledge in the communication, whereas indexical
‘‘she’’ utilizes the fact that a woman who is, say, standing in front
of agents, is common knowledge between them.
To identify the indexical structure of informative silence in
the efficient rule, we need to define the notion of context for
the current communication problem. In the current paper, since
the subject of communication is the speaker’s situation P1, it is
natural to define the context of communication at ω as the set of
13 ‘‘I’’, ‘‘tomorrow’’, and ‘‘here’’ are typical examples. Linguistic indexicals are
often called deixis. When the meaning of deixis is determined by antecedent, it
is called anaphora.
14 One of the most influential formulations of indexicals is provided by Kaplan
(1989). The central concepts in his formulation are ‘‘context’’, ‘‘character’’, and
‘‘content’’. Roughly speaking, ‘‘content’’ is the reference of an indexical; ‘‘context’’
is a variable that fixes the reference of an indexical; ‘‘character’’ is a function
that specifies the content of an indexical given a context. The current paper
follows the basic idea of Kaplan (1989).
states that is common knowledge at the current state ω between
agents.15 Hence, define the context of communication at ω as the
finest mutually self-evident event Z that contains ω, denoted by
Z(ω). Formally, let E(ω) be the set of mutually self-evident events
that contain ω. That is,
E(ω) = {X ⊂ Ω : ω ∈ X,Π1(ω′) ⊂ X,Π2(ω′) ⊂ X for all ω′∈ X}.
Then, the context of communication at ω is the smallest set in
E(ω).16 Hence, if the current context is Z , it is common knowledge
between the speaker and the listener that the current state is
somewhere in Z .
Example 3. Suppose Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and P is such that
P1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 8}, {5, 6}, {7, 4}},
P2 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {7}, {8}}.
Then, the context at each state is
Z(ω) =
{{1, 2, 3, 8} if ω ∈ {1, 2, 3, 8}
{4, 5, 6, 7} if ω ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}.
To formalize the indexicality of ∅ in the current communica-
tion problem, let X ⊂ Ω and define
Γσ (X) = X ∩ {ω ∈ Ω : σ (ω) = ∅}.
That is, Γσ (X) is the set of states in X at which a communication
rule σ uses silence.
Now, let Σ∗ be the set of fully informative communication
rules and define
XZ = {X ∈ 2P1 : X = Γσ (Z) for some σ ∈ Σ∗}.
Note that X ∈ 2P1 is a situation or a union of situations of
the speaker. Thus, XZ is a collection of situations and unions
of situations of the speaker in the context Z where some fully
informative rule uses silence. That is, the communication remains
fully informative as long as the speaker uses silence for X ∈ XZ .
Then, let us call X ∈ XZ an implicitly expressible event in a
context Z .
Let X∗Z be the most likely implicitly expressible event in the
context Z . Formally, X∗Z solves
max
X∈XZ
∑
ω∈X
π (ω).
Note that X∗Z is unique since, by assumption, there is no tie in the
probabilities of events.
Definition 1. The message ∅ at ω in σ is indexical silence if
Γσ (Z(ω)) = X∗Z(ω).
That is, if ∅ at ω is indexical silence, it refers to the most likely
implicitly expressible event at Z(ω).
As the indexical meaning of ‘‘I’’ is ‘‘the utterer of I’’, the
indexical meaning of ∅ is ‘‘the most likely implicitly expressible
event’’. Moreover, as the specific person referred by ‘‘I’’ is sys-
tematically determined according to the indexical meaning of ‘‘I’’
once the context is given, the specific event referred by ∅ is also
systematically determined according to the indexical meaning of
∅ once the context Z is known.
15 Context is a term that is used very widely. The current paper adopts
the knowledge-based context that considers context as a set of background
assumptions shared by the speaker and the listener. See Stalnaker (2014) for a
fuller discussion on this approach. Note that ‘‘physical context’’ such as spatio-
temporal location and ‘‘linguistic context’’ that consists of past utterances can
also be accommodated to knowledge-based approach when the state space is
properly constructed.
16 Note that E(ω) always contains Ω .
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Proposition 2. A communication rule σ is efficient if and only if
the message ∅ at any ω ∈ Γσ (Ω) is indexical silence.
Proof. See Appendix. □
The proof exploits the property of context; since the context
is common knowledge at any state, the set of all contexts forms
a partition of Ω , and the messaging cost minimization problem
is context-separable. Thus, one can solve the efficient communi-
cation problem by the divide-and-conquer procedure; solve the
minimization problem for each context separately and merge the
solutions to obtain the efficient communication rule. Then, by
duality, the solution of the messaging cost minimizing problem
can be obtained as the maximization of the unambiguous use of
silence given a context.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we can find that the common
knowledge property of context Z plays a crucial role. In fact,
the common knowledge property of context is essential for the
indexicality of informative silence.
Observation Suppose that, contrary to the current setting, the no-
tion of context Z is defined in a way that lacks common
knowledge property.17 Then, the efficient use of silence does
not always exhibit indexicality.
Without the common knowledge property of context Z , the cost
minimization problem is not always context-separable. Hence,
there is no guarantee that the globally efficient use of silence
coincides with the efficient use of silence within the context.
Consequently, there is no indexical meaning of silence given a
context in the efficient rule; silence could refer to, say, the second
most likely implicitly expressive event in one context, while it
refers to the most likely implicitly expressive event in another
context lacking indexical meaning. If people can appropriately
and flexibly use informative silence across various contexts in
reality, it is natural to expect that informative silence has index-
icality. In this sense, one could argue that the current definition
of context, which makes informative silence indexical, is the right
one.
Under some information structure, agents can find the effi-
cient use of silence almost immediately from the indexical prop-
erty.
Example 4. Suppose that an information structure is such that
Π1(ω) ⊊ Π2(ω) for all ω. Then, X∗Z(ω) = φ(ω) where φ(ω) solves
max
P1⊂Z(ω)
∑
ω′∈P1
π (ω′).
A notable special case of Example 4 is the informed-
uninformed agent setting. In this case, any fully informative rule
uses silence at most one situation. Thus, the speaker uses silence
to indicate the speaker’s ex-ante most common situation in the
efficient rule.
In the following example, finding the efficient use of silence
based on the indexical property demands rather careful inspec-
tion.
Example 5. Suppose Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}, and P
is such that
P1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}, {8}, {9, 10}, {11}},
P2 = {{1, 8}, {2, 3}, {4}, {5, 6}, {7, 9}, {10, 11}}.
17 For example, one might define Z(ω) as the smallest event that is mutual
knowledge at ω.
Suppose
∑
ω∈Π1(ω′) π (ω) ≤
∑
ω∈Π1(ω′′) π (ω) if ω
′ < ω′′, and the
inequality is strict if Π1(ω′) ̸= Π1(ω′′).
The information structure has two possible contexts Z ′ =
{1, 2, 3, 8} and Z ′′ = {4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11}. Then, the set of im-
plicit expressible events given Z ′ and that given Z ′′ are
XZ ′ = {{1, 2}, {3}, {8}, {3, 8}},
XZ ′′ = {{4, 5}, {6, 7}, {9, 10}, {11}, {4, 5, 9, 10},
{6, 7, 11}, {4, 5, 11}}
From the indexical property, if σ ∗ is efficient, then Γσ∗ (Z ′) =
{3, 8} and Γσ∗ (Z ′′) = {6, 7, 11}. Thus,
σ ∗(ω) =
{
∅ if ω ∈ {3, 6, 7, 8, 11}
Π1(ω) if ω ̸∈ {3, 6, 7, 8, 11}.
3.3. Complexity of indexical silence
As we saw in Example 5, when silence refers to an event
that consists of more than one situations given a context, the
user of indexical silence needs to find out the exact combination
of situations that maximizes the use of silence. Since this is
a combinatorial optimization problem, one needs to check all
‘‘reasonable combinations’’ of the use of silence to find out the
solution.
To provide some idea about how demanding the computation
can be, suppose an information structure has a context Z with
P ′1 ⊂ Z such that
Z = {ω′ : Π1(ω′) ∈ S where S ∈ S(P ′1)}.
Suppose |S| = k for all S ∈ S(P ′1), S ∩ S ′ = P ′1 for all S, S ′ ∈ S(P ′1),
and let |S(P ′1)| = l. Then, the number of implicitly expressible
events in Z is
|XZ | ≥ (k− 1)l + 1.
Thus, the number of implicitly expressible events in one context
grows exponentially in the number of relevant covers l. Note that
the burden of a large |XZ | is not only the number of comparisons
but also the computation of
∑
ω∈XZ π (ω) for every XZ ∈ XZ .
If indexical silence is interpreted as the efficient use of silence
designed by an organization, the computational burden might not
be so problematic. However, if indexical silence is considered as
a tacit communication rule for ordinary conversation, i.e., prag-
matics, the complexity of computing the use of indexical silence
would be troublesome. This calls for the analysis of the next
section.
4. Direct and ordinal indexicals
This section analyzes the information structure in which in-
dexical silence works as intuitively as indexicals in natural lan-
guages do. There are two major differences between indexical
silence and indexicals in natural languages. First, indexicals in
natural languages ‘‘directly’’ refer to an entity given a context,
whereas indexical silence could refer to a non-trivial combina-
tion of situations given a context.18 Second, indexicals in nat-
ural languages do not rely on the cardinal information in the
communication environment such as probability.
18 For instance, in Example 5, the informative silence refers to the combination
of situations {6, 7} and {11} in the context Z ′′ rather than directly referring to
a single situation in the context.
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4.1. Direct indexicals
To capture the directness of indexicals in natural languages,
let φ(ω) be the speaker’s situation that solves
max
P1⊂Z(ω)
∑
ω′∈P1
π (ω′).
That is, φ(ω) is the speaker’s most common situation in a context
Z(ω).
Definition 2. The message ∅ at ω in σ is direct indexical if
Γσ (Z(ω)) = φ(ω).
That is, if ∅ is direct indexical, informative silence refers to a
single situation of the speaker that is most likely in the current
context. Note that the efficient use of silence is not always direct
indexical. To see this, consider Example 3. The silence at ω ∈
{3, 4} in the efficient rule under the first π is direct indexical
since ∅ directly refers to the single situation given the context; in
contrast, the silence at ω ∈ {1, 2, 5, 6} in the efficient rule under
the second π is not direct indexical since ∅ refers to the union of
situations given the context.
To provide the properties of information structures in which
the efficient use of silence is direct indexical, let S(P1) be the set
of all covers that contain P1.
Definition 3. The speaker’s situation P1 is central in a context Z
if S(Π2(ω)) ∈ S(P1) for all ω ∈ Z .
That is, if a situation is central in a context, it is contained by
all covers in the context.19 Intuitively, if a situation is central in a
context, the situation is ‘‘relevant’’ to the listener at any state in
the context. Note that some context could fail to possess a central
situation. Thus, one could interpret that a context is ‘‘simple’’ in
terms of the information structure when the context contains a
central situation.
Example 6. Consider the information structure in Example 5.
Recall that this information structure has two contexts Z ′ =
{1, 2, 3, 8} and Z ′′ = {4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11}. The situation {1, 2} is
central in Z ′ since S(Π2(ω)) ∈ S({1, 2}) = {S({1, 8}), S({2, 3})} for
all ω ∈ Z ′. On the other hand, no situation is central in Z ′′ since
there is no P1 ⊂ Z ′′ that is contained by all covers in Z ′′.
Lemma 2. If the message ∅ at ω′ in an efficient communication
rule σ is direct indexical, then P(ω′) is central in Z(ω′).
Proof. See Appendix. □
The idea behind Lemma 2 is as follows. Suppose that the
speaker uses silence for a non-central situation in a context, Then,
we can always find another situation at which if the speaker
uses silence, the listener can distinguish this silence from another
silence. Consequently, the speaker needs to use silence for more
than one situation in the context, precluding direct indexical
silence.
To provide another necessary condition for direct indexicals,
let
H(ω) = {ω′ : Π1(ω′) ∈ S where S ∈ S(Π1(ω))}.
19 The notation of centrality here is not a metaphor. To see this, consider an
undirected graph G = (V , E) where V = P1 , and P1P ′1 ∈ E iff P1 ̸= P ′1 and
P1, P ′1 ∈ S(P2) for some P2 ∈ P2 . If P1 is central in Z , any vertex in Z is directly
connected to P1 .
Definition 4. The speaker’s situation Π1(ω′) is locally dominant
if∑
ω∈Π1(ω′)
π (ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Γσ (H(ω′))
π (ω)
for all σ that is fully informative and σ (ω′) = Π1(ω′).
When the speaker’s current situation is locally dominant, the
probability of having the current situation is higher than that of
any implicitly expressible event that does not use silence for the
current situation in the context.
Lemma 3. If the message ∅ at ω′ in an efficient communication
rule σ is direct indexical, then Π1(ω′) is locally dominant.
Proof. See Appendix. □
The next proposition states that centrality and local domi-
nance are not only necessary but also sufficient conditions for
direct indexicals.
Proposition 3. The message ∅ at ω′ in the efficient communication
rule σ is direct indexical if and only if Π1(ω′) is central in Z(ω′) and
locally dominant.
Proof. See Appendix. □
The next result is immediate from Proposition 3.
Corollary 1. Suppose σ is an efficient communication rule. The
message ∅ at any ω ∈ Γσ (Ω) is direct indexical if and only if every
context Z has a central and locally dominant situation.
The simplest information structure that satisfies the condition
in Corollary 1 is that in Example 4.
4.2. Ordinal indexicals
As I mentioned earlier, the second gap between indexicals in
natural languages and indexical silence is that the former can
operate solely with ordinal information such as spatial, tempo-
ral, and personal relations in context, whereas indexical silence
could require rather demanding quantitative evaluations. That is,
even though the agent can find whether a situation is central
or not from the partitional structure, checking whether a central
situation is locally dominant or not could demand the exact
computation. The rest of this section investigates a condition
under which the agent can verify the local dominance condition
solely from the ordinal information in the information structure.
To state the condition, let ψ(P2) be the solution of
max
P1∈S(P2)
∑
ω∈P1∩P2
π (ω).
That is, ψ(P2) is the speaker’s most common situation given P2,
which is unique by assumption.
Definition 5. The speaker’s situation P1 is consistently most
common if ψ(P2) = P1 for all P2 such that S(P2) ∈ S(P1).
Note that agents do not need to know the exact value of π (ω)
to find the consistently most common situation; they just need
to know the probability ranking over the set of P1 ∩ P2.
Proposition 4. The message ∅ at ω′ in the efficient communication
rule is direct indexical if Π1(ω′) is central in Z(ω′) and consistently
most common.
Proof. See Appendix. □
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One might wonder whether there is a simpler way to guaran-
tee the local dominance condition than checking the condition of
consistently most common. For instance, does having a situation
that has a higher probability than any other situation in the
context guarantee the local dominance? The next example shows
that the answer is negative.
Example 7. Suppose Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and P is such that
P1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}},
P2 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}.
Moreover, suppose
π = (0.15, 0.24, 0.2, 0.21, 0.1, 0.1).
The situation {3, 4} has a higher probability than {1, 2} and {5, 6}.
However, the combination of two situations {1, 2, 5, 6} has a
higher probability than {3, 4}, and the communication rule that
uses ∅ for {1, 2, 5, 6} is fully informative. Thus, {3, 4} is not
locally dominant.
5. Discussions
5.1. Efficient communication rules with cognitive cost
Unless agents recurrently face the same communication prob-
lem, it might be too demanding to expect them to use informative
silence efficiently beyond direct indexical in practice. In fact, if
we take into account the cognitive cost of finding the use and
meaning of non-direct indexical silence, the cognitive cost could
be even higher than the cost of using explicit messages.
When the cognitive cost is incorporated, the definition of an
efficient communication rule needs to be revised. Suppose that it
is costly to use non-direct indexical because of the cognitive cost.
Specifically, assume that
Cσ (m, ω) =
⎧⎨⎩
c ′ if m = P1
c ′′ if m = ∅ and Π1(ω) ⊊ Γσ (Z(ω))
0 if m = ∅ and Π1(ω) = Γσ (Z(ω))
That is, if ∅ refers to a set of situations rather than a particular
situation given a context, the use of informative silence is costly.
Then, the efficient communication rule under Cσ (m, ω) solves
min
σ∈Σ∗
∑
ω∈Ω
Cσ (m, ω)π (ω).
Observation Suppose c ′ < c ′′. In the efficient communication
rule under Cσ (m, ω), the speaker uses ∅ at ω if and only
if ω ∈ φ(ω).
Under Cσ (m, ω), an explicit report is less costly than ∅ when-
ever ∅ refers to a set of situations in the current context. Thus,
in the efficient communication rule under the cost function, ∅
indexically refers to the most common speaker’s situation given
a context. Note that φ(ω) is not necessarily central and locally
dominant even though the efficient use of silence under Cσ (m, ω)
is always direct indexical.
In one shot problem, the cognitive cost might often be higher
than the messaging cost unless the message requires some
lengthy report. However, when the communication problem is
recurrent, the cognitive cost might not be so expensive once
an agent learns the efficient use of silence. Note that it is also
costly to remember the rule, especially when the use of infor-
mative silence in rare contexts. Thus, whether the cognitive cost
is lower than the messaging cost depends on the nature of a
communication problem.
5.2. Efficient communication rules in games
As explained in Section 2, the current paper directly analyzes
the efficient communication rule since our primary interest is in
cooperative environments where the game theoretical formula-
tion does not provide additional insights. Needless to say, when
there is some conflict of interest between the speaker and the
listener, the game theoretical approach becomes essential since
the speaker might not wish to reveal her information anymore.
However, the analysis of the efficient communication rule can be
extended to the strategic environment.
To see the claim, suppose that the speaker and the listener
have different payoff functions that depend on the listener’s
action a and the state ω. The speaker sends a message given her
situation P1, and the listener chooses an action a. Assume that
the speaker’s message space is M = P1 ∪ {∅}, and that the cost
of an explicit message is c . Note that P1 is just a label, and so the
speaker can send a message P1 ̸= Π1(ω) at ω. First, we analyze
the equilibrium communication under c = 0. Suppose that we
are interested in the equilibrium strategy σˆ , and let Σˆ be the set
of communication rules that have the same informational content
as σˆ , i.e., if σ ∈ Σˆ , σ is relabeling of σˆ . Then, if the equilibrium
that supports σˆ is strict and c is sufficiently small, the efficient
communication rule of the equilibrium strategy σˆ can be obtained
by solving our familiar problem
min
σ∈Σˆ
∑
ω∈Ω
c(σ (ω))π (ω)
That is, given an equilibrium communication strategy, we can
analyze the efficient communication problem as in the current
paper if the cost of messaging is not too large.
In a communication game with some conflict of interest, some
equilibria might not be strict. In that case, the exact efficient
equilibrium communication cannot be obtained by the above
approach since the equilibrium strategy can be distorted by the
communication cost. However, if the cost is small, and the equi-
librium communication strategy is continuous in the change of
the messaging cost, the above method still provides a good ap-
proximation for the efficient communication rule.
Note that when there is some conflict of interest between
the speaker and the listener, the meaning of informative si-
lence cannot be determined by (Ω,P, π ) since the equilibrium
communication depends on the payoff function. Then, since a
context Z(ω) alone cannot determine the meaning of informative
silence, the informative silence loses the indexical property. This
is analogous to the fact that ‘‘yesterday’’ does not indicate one
day before the date of the utterance when the speaker has an
incentive to tell a lie about the date. In fact, people often utilize
the original meaning of an indexical to confuse the listener in a
strategic environment in practice.
6. Conclusion
Many cooperative economic activities rely on a conversation,
which often utilizes informative silence to convey information.
The current paper analyzed the pragmatics of informative silence
as the efficient communication rule designed by a fictitious lin-
guistic engineer. It is shown that when the notion of context is
defined as the finest mutually self-evident event that contains the
current state, the efficient use of informative silence exhibits the
defining property of indexicals in natural languages. That is, as
indexical ‘‘I’’ systematically refers to the person who utters the
word given a context, informative silence in the efficient rule sys-
tematically refers to the most likely implicitly expressible event
given a context. Furthermore, while the efficient use of silence
could be complex, it is also found that the efficient use of silence
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is as intuitive as the use of indexicals in natural languages if
and only if the information structure satisfies some centrality and
dominance properties. Thus, if the nature of indexicals in natural
languages reflects the cognitive capacity of the human mind, it
could be the case that ordinary people can utilize indexical silence
only if the information structure is sufficiently simple.
The idea of this paper has a wide range of economic appli-
cations. In fact, whenever some messaging cost is introduced
to an economic model with communication, the efficient use of
silence becomes a relevant problem. One direct application can be
found in team decision problems under uncertainty where team
members communicate before coordinating their actions. In this
application, an agent explicitly reports his/her information in the
efficient rule only if his/her current information is not the most
common given the current context. Another application could be
found in a principal–agent model where the principal suggests a
project based on her private information, and the agent chooses a
project and his effort level. If there is no conflict of interest in the
dimension of the project choice, the principal uses informative
silence as a message of ‘‘business as usual’’ in the efficient rule.
As it is discussed in Section 5.2, the application of informative
silence is not limited to the common interest setting; the current
approach can be extended to study the use of informative silence
in cheap talk games with a conflict of interest.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose σ is admissible, but some P ′′1 has no S ∈ S(P ′′1 ) such
that, for some P ′1 ∈ S, σ (ω) = ∅ for all ω ∈ P ′1. Then, σ (ω) =
Π1(ω) for any ω such that Π1(ω) ∈ S where S ∈ S(P ′′1 ). Now,
consider the alternative rule σ ′ such that
σ ′(ω) =
{
∅ if ω ∈ P ′′1
σ (ω) if ω ∈ Ω\P ′′1
Note that since σ ′(ω) = Π1(ω) for any ω such that Π1(ω) ∈
S\{P ′′1 } where S ∈ S(P ′′1 ),
Qσ ′ (σ (ω),Π2(ω)) = P ′′1 ∩Π2(ω)
for all ω ∈ P ′′1 . Then, since σ (ω) = Π1(ω) for any ω such that
Π1(ω) ∈ S\{P ′′1 } where S ∈ S(P ′′1 ), and σ is fully informative, σ ′ is
also fully informative. Moreover,∑
ω∈Ω
c(σ (ω))π (ω)−
∑
ω∈Ω
c(σ ′(ω))π (ω) = c
∑
ω∈P ′′1
π (ω) > 0
under any π such that supp(π ) = Ω . But then, σ is not admissible,
a contradiction.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
If part: If the message ∅ at any ω ∈ Γσ (Ω) is indexical silence,
then, for any fully informative communication rule σ ′,∑
ω′∈Γσ ′ (Z(ω))
π (ω′) ≤
∑
ω′∈Γσ (Z(ω))
π (ω′)
for all ω. Since Z(ω) is mutually self-evident at every ω, the set
of contexts is a partition of Ω . Hence,⋃
ω∈Ω
Γσ (Z(ω)) = Γσ (Ω).
Therefore, for any fully informative communication rule σ ′,∑
ω′∈Γσ ′ (Ω)
π (ω′) ≤
∑
ω′∈Γσ (Ω)
π (ω′).
Then, since∑
ω′∈Ω
c(σ (ω′))π (ω′) = c − c
∑
ω′∈Γσ (Ω)
π (ω′),
it follows that, for any fully informative communication rule σ ′,∑
ω′∈Ω
c(σ ′(ω′))π (ω′) ≥
∑
ω′∈Ω
c(σ (ω′))π (ω′).
Since any communication rule with indexical silence is fully
informative, σ is an efficient rule.
Only if part: Suppose that σ is an efficient rule, but ∅ in σ is
not indexical silence at some ω˜ ∈ Γσ (Ω). Then, Γσ (Z(ω˜)) ̸= X∗Z(ω˜).
Now consider an alternative communication rule σ ′′ such that
σ ′′(ω) =
{
σ (ω) if ω ̸∈ Z(ω˜)
σ˜ (ω) if ω ∈ Z(ω˜)
where σ˜ is some fully informative communication rule such that
Γσ˜ (Z(ω˜)) = X∗Z(ω˜). Note that σ ′′ is a fully informative commu-
nication rule by construction. Then, since Γσ (Z(ω˜)) ̸= X∗Z(ω˜) and
Γσ ′′ (Z(ω˜)) = X∗Z(ω˜),∑
ω∈Γσ (Z(ω˜))
π (ω) <
∑
ω∈Γσ ′′ (Z(ω˜))
π (ω).
Moreover, by construction,∑
ω∈Ω\Γσ (Z(ω˜))
π (ω) =
∑
ω∈Ω\Γσ ′′ (Z(ω˜))
π (ω).
Then, since ∪ω∈ΩΓσ (Z(ω)) = Γσ (Ω),∑
ω∈Γσ (Ω)
π (ω) <
∑
ω∈Γσ ′′ (Ω)
π (ω).
But then,∑
ω′∈Ω
c(σ (ω′))π (ω′) >
∑
ω′∈Ω
c(σ ′′(ω′))π (ω′).
That is, σ is not efficient, contradicting the hypothesis.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose the message ∅ at ω′ in the efficient communication
rule σ is direct indexical. Then, Γσ (Z(ω′)) = φ(ω′). Thus, the
expected cost of σ is
c − c
∑
ω∈Γσ (Ω\Z(ω′))
π (ω)− c
∑
ω∈φ(ω′)
π (ω).
Now suppose φ(ω′) is not central in Z(ω′). Then, there exists
S ′ ̸∈ S(Π1(ω′)) such that Z(ω′) ⊃ {ω : Π1(ω) ∈ S ′}. Let P ′1 ∈ S ′
be a situation that is not an element of any cover in S(Π1(ω′)).
Then, consider the alternative communication rule σ ′.
σ ′(ω) =
⎧⎨⎩
∅ if ω ∈ φ(ω′) ∪ P ′1
Π1(ω) if ω ∈ Z(ω′)\(φ(ω′) ∪ P ′1)
σ (ω) if ω ∈ Ω\Z(ω′)
Note that since P ′1 ∈ S ′ is not an element of any cover in S(φ(ω′)),
P ′1 is the only one situation with ∅ in S
′ ̸∈ S(φ(ω′)). Then, from
Lemma 1 together with the fact that σ is efficient, σ ′ is fully
informative rule.
The expected cost of σ ′ is
c − c
∑
ω∈Γσ ′ (Ω\Z(ω′))
π (ω)− c
∑
ω∈φ(ω′)∪P ′1
π (ω).
But then, since
∑
ω∈φ(ω′) π (ω) <
∑
ω∈φ(ω′)∪P ′1 π (ω), the expected
cost of σ ′ is strictly lower than that of σ . That is, σ is not efficient,
a contradiction.
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A.4. Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose the message ∅ at ω′ in the efficient communication
rule σ is direct indexical but P(ω′) is not locally dominant. Then,
there exists a fully informative rule σ ′ such that∑
ω∈Π1(ω′)
π (ω) <
∑
ω∈Γσ ′ (H(ω′))
π (ω)
and σ ′(ω′) = Π1(ω′). Now consider the following alternative
communication rule
σ ′′(ω) =
⎧⎨⎩
∅ if ω ∈ Γσ ′ (Z(ω′))
Π1(ω) if ω ∈ Z(ω′)\Γσ ′ (Z(ω′))
σ (ω) if ω ∈ Ω\Z(ω′)
Since σ and σ ′ are fully informative, and Z(ω′) is mutually self-
evident, σ ′′ is fully informative. The expected cost of σ ′′ is
c − c
∑
ω∈Γσ (Ω\Z(ω′))
π (ω)− c
∑
ω∈Γσ ′ (Z(ω′))
π (ω).
On the other hand, since the message ∅ at ω′ is direct indexical
in σ , Γσ (Z(ω′)) = φ(ω′). The expected cost of σ is
c − c
∑
ω∈Γσ (Ω\Z(ω′))
π (ω)− c
∑
ω∈φ(ω′)
π (ω).
Note that, from Lemma 2, if ∅ is direct indexical in an efficient
rule σ , then Π1(ω′) is central in Z(ω′). I claim that if Π1(ω′)
is central in Z(ω′), then Z(ω′) = H(ω′). To see this, note that
whenever ω ∈ P1 and ω ∈ H(ω′), then ω′′ ∈ H(ω′) for any ω′′ ∈ P1.
Then, since Z(ω′) is mutually self-evident, Z(ω′) ⊃ P1 for all P1 ∈ S
where S ∈ S(Π1(ω′)). Hence, Z(ω′) ⊃ H(ω′). Now suppose that
Z(ω′) ⊋ H(ω′). Then, since Z(ω′) is mutually self-evident, there
exists P1 ⊂ Z(ω′) such that P1 ̸∈ S for any S ∈ S(Π1(ω′)). Then,
Π1(ω′) is not central in Z(ω′), contradicting the hypothesis that
Z(ω′) ⊋ H(ω′). Hence, Z(ω′) = H(ω′).
From the first inequality of this proof and Z(ω′) = H(ω′),∑
ω∈φ(ω′)
π (ω) <
∑
ω∈Γσ ′ (Z(ω′))
π (ω).
But then, σ is not efficient, a contradiction.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3
Since ‘‘only if’’ part has already been established by Lemma 2
and 3, we need to show ‘‘if’’ part. Suppose that the message ∅ at
ω′ in the efficient communication rule σ is not direct indexical.
Then, Γσ (Z(ω′)) ̸= φ(ω′). The expected cost of σ is then
c − c
∑
ω∈Γσ (Ω\Z(ω′))
π (ω)− c
∑
ω∈Γσ (Z(ω′))
π (ω).
Now consider the following alternative rule,
σ ′(ω) =
⎧⎨⎩
∅ if ω ∈ φ(ω′)
Π1(ω) if ω ∈ Z(ω′)\φ(ω′)
σ (ω) if ω ∈ Ω\Z(ω′)
Since σ is fully informative and only φ(ω′) in Z(ω′) has ∅, σ ′ is
fully informative from Lemma 1. The expected cost of σ ′ is
c − c
∑
ω∈Γσ (Ω\Z(ω′))
π (ω)− c
∑
ω∈φ(ω′)
π (ω).
Now suppose φ(ω′) is central in Z(ω′) and locally dominant. Then,
Z(ω′) = H(ω′). Thus,∑
ω∈φ(ω′)
π (ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Γσ (Z(ω′))
π (ω).
From the assumption, there is no tie in the probabilities of events.
Thus, whenever the above inequality holds, it must be strict. But
then, the expected cost of σ is strictly higher than that of σ ′,
contradicting the assumption that σ is efficient.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose Π1(ω′) is consistently most common. Then,∑
ω∈Π1(ω′)∩P2
π (ω) > max
P1∈S(P2)\{Π1(ω′)}
∑
ω∈P1∩P2
π (ω)
for any P2 such that S(P2) ∈ S(Π1(ω′)).
Note that, since Π1(ω′) is central in Z(ω′), we have∑
P2⊂Z(ω′)
max
P1∈S(P2)\{Π1(ω′)}
∑
ω∈P1∩P2
π (ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Γσ (Z(ω′))
π (ω)
for any fully informative rule σ such that σ (ω′) = Π1(ω′).
Moreover,∑
P2⊂Z(ω′)
∑
ω∈Π1(ω′)∩P2
π (ω) =
∑
ω∈Π1(ω′)
π (ω),
Then, we have∑
ω∈Π1(ω′)
π (ω) >
∑
ω∈Γσ (Z(ω′))
π (ω)
for any σ that is fully informative and σ (ω′) = Π1(ω′). That is,
Π1(ω′) is locally dominant. Then, since Π1(ω′) is central in Z(ω′),
∅ at ω′ is direct indexical from Proposition 3.
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